Immigration, social cohesion and social capital

What are the links?

Roger Zetter with David Griffiths, Nando Sigona, Don Flynn, Tauhid Pasha and Rhian Beynon

This study explores the interaction between migrants’ social relationships in their community (their social capital), and the development of a stable and integrated society (social cohesion) at the local level. The concept of social capital – the processes by which individuals and groups invest in social relationships and share resources between themselves – resonates with current concerns about the ways in which different communities, notably minority ethnic groups, relate to their wider social world.

The report outlines how, since the 1990s, the increasing volume and diversity of migrants has affected the UK’s political landscape. It reviews how the government has prioritised the need for social cohesion, to counter the perceived challenges which new migrants pose to a cohesive ‘national identity’. This stance marks a significant shift away from the longstanding promotion of multicultural race relations and the acceptance of ‘difference’.

The report questions the extent to which the formation of social capital, either as a concept or in practice, can provide a satisfactory basis for reconciling the contradictions between social cohesion and the social differentiation reflected in diverse migrant communities.
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Introduction

This paper is based on a literature review and interviews with a sample of immigrant organisations. Divided into five chapters, it:

1. provides a context, which outlines a new era of migration and the complex of domestic issues it raises

2. examines the links between the new migration, social cohesion and policy development

3. summarises the concept of social capital, the critiques of the concept and its relationship to social cohesion

4. uses fieldwork data to explore the significance of social capital in developing an understanding of social cohesion among immigrant communities, and highlights the policy implications

5. summarises the key findings and outlines further questions and policy issues.
1 Context – the new migration and social relations

The context of this concepts paper is defined by a new era of international migration that has had profound impacts on the political landscape of the UK, as in much of the rest of Europe. The new migration has been precipitated by several factors. Among the most significant, in the case of the UK, are: an unprecedented rise in spontaneous asylum seeking over the last decade and a half (Zetter et al., 2003a, 2003b); economic migration facilitated by increasing global mobility (Castles, 1995; Vertovec 1997, 2001); and EU policies for the free movement of labour, particularly in relation to enlargement with the new accession states (Geddes, 2000, Zetter et al., 2006, forthcoming). Of these three variables, the asylum issue is likely to recede as a key factor in the migration equation, while global and EU labour mobility remain the drivers of ‘managed migration’ and cohesion policies.

The variety and complexity of factors propelling the new migration have generated a distinctive set of domestic characteristics and impacts in the UK, which underpin contemporary political concerns and highlight significant issues in the social relations between settled communities and new migrants.

- The increased volume of migration in the last decade or so contrasts with a relatively long period of controlled, limited entry and challenges the Government’s stated intention to manage the flow in an environment of hostile race relations.

- Ethnic and cultural identities are increasingly diverse, challenging the laissez-faire multicultural policies for migrant integration in the past, when there were fewer but more clearly defined groups – at least in the public mind.

- Greater cultural, ethnic and religious plurality confronts perceptions of a cohesive ‘national identity’ and citizenship (Soysal, 1994); tensions between settled and new migrants generate a sub-set of questions about shared identities.

- A series of controversial legislative changes from 1993–99 to the provision of welfare support for asylum seekers caused confusion and undermined the capacity of service agencies to plan the settlement of newcomers; asylum-seeker dispersal has fuelled resentment about access to housing and other public resources in locations already experiencing high levels of social deprivation (Craig et al., 2003; Griffiths et al., 2005; Zetter and Pearl, 2000; Zetter et al., 2003c, 2005).
Government immigration policies that simultaneously deter and restrict entry yet promote cohesion and assimilation of migrant communities give contradictory and conflicting messages.

Socio-economic disadvantage and structural inequalities in labour markets, housing and neighbourhood services remain embedded among both settled and new migrant communities; in the latter case, an economic underclass appears to be emerging, which has implications for social and employment policies.

Civic, governance and leadership structures, thought to be the cornerstone of harmonious race relations, do not appear to be as resilient as previously assumed to cope with inter-communal tension and ‘parallel worlds’ (Home Office 2001, 2003a, 2004a, 2005).

Ambiguous or hostile media messages fuel anxieties about migration and its impacts on identity, employment, and public and welfare services (Runnymede Trust, 2005).

There is increasing impatience in black and minority ethnic (BME) communities for social and political change to address socio-economic inequalities, governance structures that do not fully represent their interests and media hostility.

The backcloth of so-called global terrorism, and the ‘securitisation of migration’, heighten anxieties about the ‘other’ with a potentially stigmatising impact on Islamic faith believers in particular.

Of course, these are by no means all novel features of host–migrant relations. Indeed the recurrence of key elements – for example, socio-economic disadvantage, media hostility, the real or imagined anxiety that immigration is ‘out of control’ – is a striking feature of the politics of immigration not only in the post-war period but also over the last century (Kershan, 2005). However, it is the combination of both these enduring and new variables, together with the changing global context of migration processes that explains the contemporary political saliency of immigration. Its prominence in the UK political landscape is evidenced by a remarkable period of policy turbulence and the intensifying spate of legislation (five Acts of Parliament in 11 years), government White Papers, consultation documents and reports (e.g. Home Office, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a, 2004b, 2005). Contextualised by the harmonisation of EU immigration and asylum policy (agreed in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997), and EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 (Zetter et al., 2006, forthcoming), these conditions are mirrored across western Europe. Here, as in the UK, the new patterns and processes of immigration define a policy agenda similarly dominated by issues of race relations, ethnic diversity, social exclusion and national ‘identity’.
2 New migration, social cohesion and policy development

Establishing good community relations between settled and migrant communities has been a long-standing policy objective of successive British governments. To this end, promoting multicultural race relations has been the defining feature of the policy framework for migrant settlement and incorporation for nearly five decades (Miles and Cleary, 1993; Schuster and Solomos, 1999; Schuster, 2003). With its focus on equal opportunities and anti-discriminatory practices, only limited differences in emphasis and rhetoric have marked an essentially bipartisan approach across the main political divide.

Now, in a radically different era of migration, successive governments have struggled to reconcile and adapt this policy framework to complex new trends and impacts. This has resulted in significant redefinition. In contrast to a policy in which diversity was accommodated, even if not fully accepted, social cohesion is the currently favoured shorthand to address the complex and often disjunctive set of policy challenges outlined above (Cantle, 2005). The term frequently elides with a lexicon of similar phrases such as community cohesion, social inclusion and integration, and antonyms such as social exclusion.

Social cohesion policy in the UK reflects a wider European agenda. As early as 1998, the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation 1355 on ‘Fighting against social exclusion and strengthening social cohesion in Europe’.1 Significantly, social cohesion was advocated as a vital requirement of an enlarged Europe – echoing one of the drivers of UK policy noted in the Introduction. However, promoting cohesion as a rights-based objective – a feature of the 1998 Council of Europe Recommendation – has not found support in UK policy making. Later European Commission and Council of Europe decisions resonate more closely with the UK’s stance. Here cohesion is vigorously promoted in integrationist terms – social and economic – in order to reduce the risk of social and political disruption (Council of Europe, 2000a, 2000b; European Commission, 2000a, 2000b, 2001).

In the UK, the explicit promotion of social cohesion as a policy objective, marking as it does the significant shift away from the long-standing promotion of multicultural race relations, is demarcated by three factors: the adoption of an assimilationist stance on migrant incorporation; the relative diminution of policies on material welfare for migrant communities; and the shift in institutional responsibility.
First, the issue of migrant settlement and incorporation is now problematised, in policy terms, as a perception that new trends in migration somehow challenge notions of a cohesive ‘national identity’. The extent to which Britain has ever been a cohesive society, given its multicultural history, remains an open question. Nevertheless, there is concern that the new migration (i.e. greater cultural, ethnic and religious plurality) jeopardises commonly held norms and values by which a nation state such as Britain identifies itself. In turn these trends, it is suggested, undermine the assumed bases of social solidarity, identities and shared histories by which citizenship and belonging are conferred (Anderson, 1983; Soysal, 1994; Weiner 1995). The diminution of these norms, however, is not the simple outcome of migration and the impact of migrants: many factors are at play here. But it is the perception that the new migration (and, although unstated, earlier migration as well) and cohesion are inversely correlated that currently drives public concern and policy making in this sphere.

The challenge of promoting social cohesion, the last Government contended, is to reconcile the competing tendencies for communities, on the one hand, to accept and celebrate differences while, on the other hand, helping different faiths, cultures and ethnicities build on shared aims rather than focusing on these differences. However, in mainstreaming of cohesion policy over the last three to four years – most recently elaborated in January 2005 (Home Office, 2005) – and similarly in developing the refugee integration strategy (Castles et al., 2002; Home Office, 2000, 2004a), a different picture emerges. Despite the generous interpretation of cohesion offered by government indicators (Home Office, 2003c) and the rhetoric that ‘integration ... is not about assimilation into a single homogeneous culture’ (Home Office, 2004a, p. 4), in practice the policies tilt firmly in the direction of inclusivity and assimilation as the instruments of social cohesion for new (and indeed settled) migrant communities. In this respect the citizenship and integration programmes clearly demarcate social cohesion in assimilationist terms as ‘promoting inclusive notions of citizenship, identity and belonging’ (Home Office 2004a, p. 6), less in recognising (and celebrating) difference, and promoting cross-cultural dialogue and understanding – the cornerstones of the former multicultural race relations policy.

A ‘unilateral’, national-level diagnosis of a cohesive community thus prevails under the ‘citizenship’ label. Yet, this is at odds with the Government’s promotion of social cohesion as an essentially localised process of building on shared aims (Home Office, 2005). Indeed, as Rudiger and Spencer (2004, p. 9) note:

... social cohesion does not require communities to merge into an homogeneous entity ... On the contrary cohesion can be achieved in a pluralist society through the interaction of different communities that build a bond through the recognition of difference and interdependence.
The Council of Europe echoes this understanding of cohesion: ‘It is not the denial but rather, the recognition of differences which keeps communities together’ (Council of Europe, 2000a, p. 11). As we shall see later in the paper, the tension between the national policy agenda and diverse local practices is a key variable in how cohesion and social capital play themselves out.

Second, examining social cohesion in material terms provides further evidence of the shift in the policy framework. Embedded and marked inequalities along ethnic lines have been the long-standing experience of migrant communities in the UK. For new migrants as well, poor housing, education, access to welfare services and low-wage employment reinforce the conditions for segregation between established and immigrant communities, and accentuate political concerns about the emergence of parallel social worlds and the spectre of racial disharmony. A definition of cohesion in these terms confirms that improved access to employment and housing – given that the majority of BME communities live in the most deprived localities of the country – and the reduction of income disparities remain pressing policy requirements. Indeed the Government’s cohesion policy reinforces this view (Home Office, 2005). Yet, at the same time, compared with earlier eras of social policy, this more instrumental view of cohesion has had to make space for the Government’s conception of cohesion in terms of social relationships, community bonds and local networks. As Rudiger’s (2006, forthcoming, p. 19) typology makes clear, the thrust of government initiatives is towards reforming the governance of community relations as much as in directly improving service provision. Rudiger identifies key features such as promoting responsive public agencies, building support networks, developing proactive media relations and public education, mentoring, community and civic development. These variables resonate with recent Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) research findings on *Learning to Live Together* (Temple and Moran et al., 2005).

The third indicator of the changed policy framework is the shift in the locus of national policy making for host–migrant relations. This now lies in the Home Office and is a marked departure from the past where the environment department (in its various guises) was conventionally the lead agency for community relations, conceived primarily in terms of housing conditions and inadequate neighbourhood resources. As noted above, while neighbourhood renewal strategies highlight the environmental dimensions of policies to tackle social exclusion, this is much less profiled than the Home Office’s social and community cohesion policy agenda. Under the Home Office, social cohesion between hosts and migrants is contextualised within the wider frame of migration policy, notably dominated by the specific characteristics of asylum and refugee migration, and the public security discourse. Moreover, the lead role of the Home Office is consistent with the current premise that social cohesion is primarily a challenge of governance. While there is a logic to this,
shifting the institutional focus introduces new complexities and contradictions: inevitably, the lack of ‘joined-up’ policy making persists.

Reshaping the new community relations policy of social cohesion has thus produced contradictory outcomes. Despite the rhetoric of developing ‘shared aims’ as a key objective, the process of developing social cohesion is ill defined. Confusing messages and countervailing tendencies challenge both the validity and efficacy of the policy. There is the unresolved tension, noted earlier, between a broad, nationally conceived policy and a large and disparate array of local practices of ‘cohesion’ as community interaction, building social networks, developing mutual respect (Rudiger, 2006, forthcoming). The latter are certainly highlighted in government thinking (Local Government Association–Home Office, 2002). The Government’s own research into indicators of integration also draws attention to local-level variables (Home Office, 2002b, 2003b, 2004c). At the same time the Community Cohesion Panel (2004) has also reported to Government the need to clarify the relationship between central government accountability for settlement and the lead role of local authorities and other stakeholders at the local level. But to what extent does local diversity compete with and undermine a rather simpler national formula? Equally, the failure of government policy adequately to prepare and resource local communities to receive new migrants, for example asylum seekers dispersed under national policy directives, is leading to deteriorating local community relations (Craig et al., 2003).

The process of reshaping policy has produced an uncertain balance between the current promotion of cohesion as the principal objective and the long-standing conception of integration in terms of material needs, equal opportunities and access to life chances. Cohesion as a process of developing social relationships, community bonds and ‘a common stake in British society’ (Home Office, 2005, p. 43) has been vigorously promoted at the expense of the traditional orthodoxy. The problem however is that, by radically shifting its approach and definition up to 2004, the Government appeared to marginalise the established policy framework in favour of the ‘new’ policy of cohesion. In practice these complementary interpretations must coexist. The Government appears to recognise this, redressing the balance by restoring a twin-track approach: this is clearly articulated in the 2005 community cohesion policy statement (Home Office, 2005). But the legacy of these policy shifts is a lack of policy coherence at the national level and uncertainty of direction at the local level among both public agencies and minority community groups.

Simultaneously the Government, indeed the same department, has been responsible for promoting cohesion while implementing and constantly reinforcing an elaborate policy of deterrence and restrictionism to would-be migrants. Mixed policy messages, and the covert political language that often accompanies them, inevitably create
confusion within and between host and BME communities (both settled and recent), sharpening differences rather than cementing community relationships. In this context, van Vugt’s research (van Vugt et al., 2000, 2003; van Vugt and Snyder, 2002) indicates that communities with little tradition of migration, but which experience a large influx of new migrants, display reduced levels of community cohesion and integration compared with communities with a long-standing tradition of migration. Yet only now is policy reinforcing the obvious point that cohesion is as much about how interactions take place between migrant communities and local hosts as it is about the performance of migrant communities themselves. Our discussion of fieldwork evidence in Chapter 4 highlights the importance of recognising the diversity and complexity of local practices and experiences.

In short, while migrant communities remain in the spotlight, it is neither evident what it is they might be cohering to, nor clear who is, or should be, doing the cohering. The persistence of these and other dilemmas and contradictions demonstrates the challenge of developing and implementing social cohesion policy.

Thus, stating the broad objective of social cohesion is far simpler than defining what social cohesion is in practice and the processes to accomplish it: both are politically and academically contentious (e.g. Pahl, 1991; Woolley, 1998; Kearns and Forrest, 2000; Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Jenson, 2001; Beauvais and Jenson, 2002). Social theorists, as we shall see in the next chapter, have less difficulty in accepting the coexistence of similarity with difference and diversity than policy makers who tend to pose social cohesion almost as an ideological position.

If social cohesion is seen in terms of establishing mechanisms for integration, then factors such as income differentials, labour market access, employment opportunities and housing conditions tend to be more relevant. Yet, as we have seen, although these factors are the mainstay of past policies, they are not at the crux of current government action. On the other hand, if social cohesion is premised on developing social relations between different groups, then attention to social networks and community interaction will be prioritised. It is by conceiving cohesion in these latter terms that government policy makers have been strongly attracted to the concept of social capital. The concept appears to offer potentially valuable apparatus for reconciling diversity with shared values, aims and aspirations, in a socially cohesive way. The concept also resonates with the somewhat equivocal emphasis that the Government’s social cohesion policy places on local communities and groups to build trust and networks within an enabling, though at times instrumental, national framework for cohesion.
3 Social capital and social cohesion

With the exception of Giddens’ theories of structuration and Foucault’s work on the fusion of state apparatus and social power, few recent sociological concepts have generated the intensity of academic interest and policy-maker influence as Putnam’s concept of social capital (Putnam, 1993, 1996, 2000; see, for example, Baron et al., 2000; Johnston and Piercy Smith, 2003). The concern is a central task of sociology – to explain the forms and processes of social organisation. Focusing on the ‘vibrancy of associational life’ and indicators of civic participation, Putnam identifies social capital as the crucial element in social organisation, which he defines as the ‘features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam, 1996, p. 56). Putnam provides a typology of organisational processes, bonding, bridging and linking (i.e. intra-community, inter-community and community–public agency), by which social groups invest in and share social capital within and between themselves.

The ‘features of social life’ and the organisational processes that Putnam identifies, resonate with current concerns about the ways in which different community groups, specifically ethnic minorities, develop and associate with their wider social world: in other words the extent of cohesion or differentiation. The resemblance between the vocabulary of social capital and social cohesion is both striking and probably intentional.

Three aspects of the concept account both for its attraction and the limitations that its critics have pointed out. First, there is the very elasticity of the concept, likened to ‘a metaphoric, shorthand notion’ (Vertovec, 2001, p. 11) embodying a range of theoretical assumptions and perspectives. Second, there is the saliency of the terminology – norms, values, trust, bonding, bridging and linking – for politicians seeking to reconcile increasing cultural diversity with notions of a socially cohesive, shared ‘national identity’. Third, there is an attractive clarity and positiveness in the definition of organisational processes. Bridging, bonding and linking capital have a benign character suggesting that, for policy makers at least, the contradictory dynamics of social cohesion and social differentiation can coexist. The reassuring vocabulary simultaneously endorses notions of social cohesion while diminishing the perceived threats of social exclusion and diversity.

Campbell (2001, p. 5) suggests: ‘the concept does have the potential to serve as a modest starting point for research seeking to conceptualise the community level of analysis in particular situations’. But Putnam’s conception of social capital is contested. Critics suggest that it does not provide an overarching conceptualisation
that is self-sufficient, robust and free-standing. As already suggested, the concept elides with other models and concepts of social organisation. There is objection to the perceived circularity of the concept and doubt that it can be convincingly measured empirically. Even so, many researchers have sought to elaborate and fill the gaps of the ‘quasi-concept’.

Among the principal structural limitations perhaps the most significant criticism is the tendency, in Putnam’s conception of social capital, towards the consensualism of voluntary association and thus the idealisation of community solidarity. Social cohesion perhaps shares a similar ring of consensualism. This premise ignores the fact that communities are ‘far more complex than the concept of social capital can capture’ (Campbell, 2001, p. 4). Rather than social capital as an instrument of cohesion, there is a highly contested territory of political power (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) and the very real practical struggle that community groups face over scarce resources (with which to ‘establish’ social capital and thus cohesion) at different levels of governance (Kearns and Forrest, 2000). Indeed our research, both later in the paper and elsewhere, emphasises the conflictual environment affecting refugee organisations and communities, which then negatively impacts on social cohesion (Griffiths et al., 2005, Griffiths, 2006; Zetter et al., 2005). Siisiäinen (2000) further emphasises the significance of distrust and conflict – conflicts between different parts of civil society – resulting in different types of association with conflicting aims and interests, not the voluntary and consensual social and policy environments in Putnam’s view of social capital and those advocating social cohesion. Neither should the ‘dark side’ of social capital as a cohesive process be downplayed: resistance to immigration and the exclusion of outsiders (Portes, 1995) is reflected in the resurgence of right-wing extremist political organisations and locally elected councillors in recent years.

These critiques question the relevance of social capital, predicated on a notion of social cohesion and consensualism. In the contemporary political landscape both concealed and sometimes open conflict exists between host and immigrant communities. We return to this conclusion later.

A second line of criticism contends that ascendancy of the concept hinges on the international popularity of the neo-liberal agenda, which prioritises tight fiscal management, reduction in public welfare expenditure and the consequent erosion of welfare entitlements (Harriss, 2002; Zetter, 2004). If social capital can be used to mobilise popular resources, then the rationale for state-administered welfare is further undermined. From a slightly different standpoint, others argue that recourse to social networks and capital typically occurs as a ‘coping strategy’ in situations of heightened social pressure (Molyneux, 2001). Certainly, as regards asylum seekers
and refugees, the proliferation of new migrant organisations compensates for the reduction of state welfare for asylum seekers and refugees. These marginalised populations internalise social capital to fill the chasm left by withdrawal of state support (Zetter et al., 2003a, 2005; Griffiths et al., 2005). Equally, the importance of NGOs clustered around health and education issues, for non-refugee immigrant populations, suggests that the issue is not so much ‘withdrawal’ as inadequate consideration of the special health and educational needs of the communities.

Social capital should not therefore seek to celebrate and reinforce what arises, in large measure, from declining state responsibility.

A third critical concern questions the relevance of social capital theory to the very different setting of migrant communities. Putnam’s research involves voluntary associations that incorporate residents and citizens who are already ‘integrated’ into a wider society and polity. Putnam’s current thinking on social capital in the context of ‘outsiders’, such as immigrant communities and ethnic minorities seeking entry to pre-existing patterns of associational life, has yet to be published.

Research on refugees and asylum seekers partially fills this gap. Loizos (1999, 2000) echoes Coleman’s (1998) account of social relations as resources used by actors to realise their goals – in particular shared values and norms of trust, expectations and reciprocity. He shows how refugees, as ‘social capitalists’, turn to one another to reconstruct their networks in exile as a means of support and to establish a meaningful sense of social life and identity. Indeed, using similar terms to Putnam, Loizos identifies ‘the package of customs, beliefs and practices from before their dislocation which continued to serve them in diasporic adjustment’ (Loizos, 2000, p. 132, emphasis added).¹

Our research casts a rather different perspective on social capital among refugees and asylum seekers in contemporary Britain (Zetter et al., 2003c, 2005; Griffiths et al., 2005, Griffiths, 2006). We confirm that new associational forms are developing – social capital is apparently being created. But these organisations perform an essentially defensive role in an environment of hostile immigration policy. They may resist participation in formal institutional frameworks. We contend, therefore, that this social capital constitutes the currency of differentiation, fragmentation and exclusion, not a vehicle of social cohesion that Putnam’s concept implies.

Several researchers, while remaining sceptical, have nonetheless elaborated the concept. Forrest and Kearns (2001) disaggregate social capital into more specific components – empowerment, participation, associational activity, supporting networks, collective values, trust, safety and belonging. These are important and
familiar terms in the context of immigrant communities (e.g. Rex et al., 1987). Again, the similarity with the vocabulary of social cohesion – like social capital a similarly contested concept – is striking: for example, in Kearns and Forrest's terms, cohesion comprises common values, social order, social solidarity, place attachment, social networks (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; Forrest and Kearns, 2001), and, for Woolley (1998), inclusion, interaction, shared values, associational activity. Portes (1995, p. 5) differentiates membership of social structures, Putnam's focus, from the resources acquired through such membership. This distinction between social capital as an associational process and as a material commodity is particularly significant in the context of new migrant communities, as we discuss below.

In this context, echoing Putnam's typology of the three processes of social capital formation, Coleman (1998) focuses on ‘dense’ ties (family and kinship – bonding capital in Putnam’s terms), which may be better placed to elaborate social capital than ‘weak’ ones (formal ties with institutions outside the immediate family – Putnam’s bridging and linking capital). This distinction reflects our own findings among refugee migrant groups, noted above. If this is the case, the tendency for new migrants towards differentiation and a form of cultural/ethnic involution, rather than networking and bridging, again has significant implications for debates and policies on social cohesion.

The conceptions of social capital and cohesion share the notion of social networks – another concept that is currently popular among researchers investigating migrant communities – perhaps, in part, because it has not become so politically instrumental. Social networks are resource and information channels that enable communities, individuals and groups to establish their social well-being by facilitating access to symbolic and material resources (Ritchey, 1976; Gurak and Caces, 1992; Drury, 1994; Rex, 1994; Koser, 1997; Arango, 2000; Siisiäinen, 2000; Koser and Pinkerton, 2002).
4 Social capital, social cohesion and immigrant communities

We now reflect on the fieldwork interviews with key informants that were conducted with a small number of immigrant community groups – usually the chairperson or convener. The sample is not intended to be representative, neither are we presenting robust empirical data. Despite these caveats, our fieldwork does enable us to: elaborate an understanding of social capital and social cohesion within a framework of current policy and practice; explore the links, if any, between these processes in the social worlds of these communities; and consider the policy implications in an era of increasingly volatile attitudes to immigration.

In establishing the links between social capital and social cohesion there are two underlying and related themes in our analysis. The first is to consider the types of social capital and social cohesion that develop. Do they echo Putnam’s typology and under what circumstances do they develop, or not? The second theme is to consider whether the promotion of social capital, operating within specific migrant communities, produces wider social cohesion; or, instead, does social capital formation result in widening ethnic enclaves and reinforcing forms of separation?

Cohesion and social capital – policy agendas and community perceptions

A significant distinction exists in how social capital and social cohesion are interpreted as part of the wider national policy agenda, as opposed to the perceptions in practice among the community groups themselves. In contrast to the normative formulation driven by concerns to manage immigration and cohesion constructed around shared values, common aims and citizenship, migrant communities tend to view social capital and social organisation in rather more traditional terms found in the sociological literature (e.g. Rex et al., 1987, Gold, 1992; Rex, 1994): as an agency of integration; emphasising the functionality of organisations; reconstructing the sense of identity; mediating between the minority and host society. Thus the development of social capital among immigrant groups is a response to a variety of complex stimuli, which may not always conform to the policy aspiration of ‘cohesiveness’. Among the stimuli are the following:

- combating and adjusting to social exclusion, for example the difficulties of accessing welfare entitlements
■ celebrating and reinforcing different cultural identities

■ mediating a response to social needs, but where the notions of ethnicity and ‘being immigrants’ may be less evident than the needs themselves

■ organising to participate in wider social activities

■ establishing an identity and presence in order to define a negotiating position vis-à-vis other groups or institutions and agencies who may control public resources

■ expressing solidarity against perceived threats to cultural norms.

In other words, to the extent that social capital exists, it is the very diversity of community identities as well as their distinctive social needs – often exacerbated by prevailing institutional rules and exclusionary characteristics – that appear to be the driving forces. These conclusions imply that social capital formation may not be a particularly effective instrument of social cohesion.

**Gender and demography**

Both gender and demographic composition of migrant populations emerge as significant variables in the way social capital is formed and the timing of its accumulation and investment.

New migrants appear to accumulate bonding capital at early stages; but, among young single men, who form a prominent segment, the impetus to develop this into formal associational groups seems relatively weak and fragile. The types of formation are contingent to local social and political circumstances. Where it occurs, this bonding may be expressed in what, superficially, appear to be rather trite social purposes – for example, forming a football team to participate in local leagues, sharing familiar genres of music. But these activities conceal more profound processes. Such bonding may often be a defensive reaction to fears of locally hostile race relations; it may represent collective action to support material needs, given the economic marginality of many new migrants; and it may be the only way to do something meaningful while waiting for a decision on immigration status. For example, Romanian construction workers meet the rest of their community at the Orthodox Church each week. Echoing Coleman’s (1998) ‘dense ties’, the church is a fundamental tool for finding new jobs and social support. Shared ethnicity thus provides a context for bonding capital to develop to support these significant socio-economic needs.
Social capital, social cohesion and immigrant communities

On the whole, our evidence points to the value of social capital as ‘membership’ rather than ‘resources’, using Portes’ (1995) distinction, while both the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties, in Coleman’s (1998) terminology, seem to be present in groups that self-identify. Whether all this amounts to the formation of social capital, in other words some formally constituted and sustainable structure of mutual support and exchange, or whether it is just a more conventional process of social networking by young people for their immediate social needs, remains uncertain.

To the extent that such bonding consolidates people of similar ethnicity, then this process reveals a sense of common purpose and shared values. Yet, although this social capital is ethnically based, it is not necessarily an explicit expression of a distinctive ethnic identity per se. Arguably, ethnicity is not an independent variable but manifests itself through the shared needs and aspirations of specific groups. Neither is there much evidence of bridging capital between new migrant groups and other minority ethnic groups or settled communities envisaged in the Government’s cohesion policy.

A striking feature to emerge from our interviews is the impetus that women and children in migrant groups provide for generating and accumulating social capital. Notable here is a set of collective objectives developed around health care and education needs. Women and children’s health, the incidence of childhood illness, childcare and a gamut of fundamental concerns related to educational access and provision all turn, to a remarkable degree, on state policy, public resources and stakeholder involvement. Minority communities recognise, therefore, that they need a distinctive ‘presence’ with public agencies in order to negotiate gender and child-related health and educational concerns, aspirations and needs. Thus, communities seek leadership (we discuss leadership below as another significant variable) and organisation to negotiate these requirements. In some groups, women may be among the most active voices and possess the skills for leadership; but, in other social and cultural circumstances, it may be men who provide the visible leadership and ‘presence’ to represent the needs of women and children.

Together, these two areas of social welfare constitute a powerful driving force in forming social capital – bonding capital within the group and linking capital to the provider institutions and agencies. Significant also is the distinction between the internal and external worlds by which the communities define and present their social capital – the internal world of women and children may be presented externally by men.

These are novel perspectives on social capital and, while not unique to immigrant groups, these factors appear to create a powerful dynamic for expressing, first, the identity of the group and, then, their needs. These conclusions reveal the complexity
of the processes by which social capital is formed and presented. Given that the objective is to invest in structures that dominate, among others, the realms of British social policy, then arguably this social capital is adding to social cohesion defined as shared priorities and values. On the other hand, if the formation of social capital among migrant groups is to highlight that ‘other’ needs are not represented – such as gendered and culturally sensitive religious education and health care – then the challenge remains how to reconcile diversity, most sharply reflected in competing expenditure priorities for different communities, with a consensual view.

Leadership, empowerment and organisation

Although we have developed a perspective on how social capital is formed among migrant groups, we have less evidence to explain how and why it flourishes, or indeed, why it may remain static or decline. However, our interviews confirm the importance of communities establishing leadership as both an organisational feature and an instrument of social capital as well. Our evidence supports Forrest and Kearns’ (2001) view of the importance of leadership as a means of empowerment and participation.

Often on a voluntary basis to start with, the role of an ambassador and advocate who can articulate the community’s needs, as well as competent organisational skills, are vital attributes, especially in developing bridging and linking social capital. Migrant communities are quick to identify leaders in these terms.

Typically among the migrant groups of our study, the vital attributes of leadership are the trust of the community (because they share the same background) and some demonstration of successful achievement in the UK through, for example, the development of professional skills or accumulating business assets. Paradoxically, those who might be considered to be the best educated are often separated from the rest of the community, are not put in a position to represent them and, in any case, may keep themselves separate. Perhaps surprisingly, some community leaders may not necessarily speak fluent English. Even so, the ability to speak English, often associated with professional qualifications and experience, may together be crucial factors for a migrant community to develop linking social capital.

Of course, multiple leadership roles are needed to tackle different agendas and priorities since migrant communities, like others, are not homogeneous social entities and ‘single-issue’ groups – although the latter may occur. Thus, different leadership requirements develop depending on the form of social capital being created. Equally, just as social capital is a dynamic commodity, so too is the leadership that manages it.
A notable feature of the leadership of migrant groups in our study is the process of skilling up. In order to sustain and enhance the social capital of groups, the preliminary criteria for leadership noted above gradually change. Professionalism replaces the widespread use of volunteers. Familiarity with bureaucratic structures, stakeholder networks, funding mechanisms and agencies, and key decision-making agencies become essential requirements. Although some groups in our study have depended on charismatic leadership to build and consolidate social capital, others are highly democratic. No clear pattern and process emerges at this stage of our work.

In this context, the need to build capacity and management skills emerges as a crucial priority at the critical stage where migrant communities are attempting to consolidate after a start-up phase. According to interviewees, it is in this stage that public resources are most needed for core funding and capacity building; but it is at this stage that resources are most difficult to access because the organisations may lack credibility and a track record. There are echoes here of the critique of social capital as an instrument of neo-liberal fiscal policy. Autonomy rather than dependency on public finances may be valued. But there is also the paradox that promoting social cohesion among migrant communities may be undermined if there is insufficient public investment in their social capital.

Arguably, then, social capital, in these terms, is not just about the Government’s promotion of shared values and identities (crucial though these may be) but requires other kinds of investment such as in leadership. The role of leadership, and the links to social cohesion, are given immediacy by the Home Office reports on the disturbances in 2001. There is some ambiguity as to whether it was weak and ineffectual leadership or the politics of ethnic and religious separatism that gave rise to the parallel worlds of Cantle’s metaphor. However, if social cohesion is premised, in part, on enhancing social capital among migrant groups then this conclusion raises a rather different set of issues about leadership than concluded by Cantle (Home Office, 2001).

Some of our evidence points to a gradual process of co-optation of leaders and organisations into the social and political mainstream and prevailing norms – membership of establishment organisations, trade unions, local political parties – rather than celebrating a distinctive ethnic identity and association. Another settled migrant organisation has taken on the characteristics of a Victorian charity in the way it is organised and dispenses social capital among members and clients. These examples demonstrate the social capital of social cohesion in the current government interpretation.
Yet, simultaneously, remittances are sent ‘back home’ as part of a continuing social responsibility, or in times of national emergency or natural disasters. If social capital is an instrument and expression of social cohesion then it is must capture this plurality of affiliations, and the coexistence of cohesion and separateness. Many minority communities seem to manage these multiple identities quite comfortably. This is a vitally important conclusion for a community cohesion policy premised on reconciling both shared and distinctive cultural identities. It points to the need for further research to elaborate more precisely how this coexistence is developed and sustained so that policy may be better informed.

**Immigration status**

Immigration status provides a range of insights into the development of social capital and its implications for social cohesion.

Immigration status is an important stimulus in the formation of social capital in the current political climate. Self-evidently, the humanitarian backdrop constitutes the impetus to develop social capital for asylum seekers trying to establish their immigration status. Sharing experience of claims for refugee status, signposting services and establishing support networks are the main features.

As we have seen above, there is a complex interplay between the early stages of settlement and ethnic identity. Clearly, self-identification of ethnicity, and how this differentiation expresses itself in the longer term, has implications for social cohesion. In the present climate of immigration policy, there are good reasons why minorities may wish to remain invisible to outsiders and resist forming themselves into explicit organisational structures. This context may generate social capital as the currency of exclusion and a resource that reinforces marginality not cohesion. In these circumstances bonding capital may constitute an end state, rather than a stage in a dynamic process of bridging and linking out to other communities and institutions.

However, once positive immigration status has been secured, the process of accumulating social capital is usually sustained, but diversification takes place. New objectives come to the fore, such as micro-financing business development or satisfying housing needs.

Immigration status thus highlights the transition that appears to take place in the form of social capital. This transition is from what could be termed the ‘virtual’ or ‘soft’ social capital of membership and process (in order to share vital experience), to the
‘hard’ or ‘convertible’ currency of resource-based social capital (necessary to satisfy material needs). This resonates with Portes’ (1995) distinction between the social capital of membership and resources.

Another perspective on immigration is the way the displacement of political conflict from countries of origin to the UK in refugee migrant groups may also be an important feature in sustaining social capital: for example, continuing the campaigns for political and human rights reform back home, the very conditions that gave rise to asylum seeking in the first place. Likewise, continuing national struggles, a dominant element among Kurdish groups for example, also renders all but meaningless a subscription to a centralised concept of Britishness and cohesion in British society. For many refugees, their social capital is constituted by an overt political agenda that is played out elsewhere and that revolves around the prospect of repatriation not the social capital of cohesion in Britain. Moreover, it may be useful to recall the role played by diaspora communities (e.g. Iraqis, Iranians, Kurds) in the current international political arena. Instrumental use is made of these diasporic networks by British and other western governments as a tool of foreign policy. The ‘otherness’ of these communities and their social capital is recognised and empowered, while they also become settled as part of the social capital of broader British society. We have noted earlier the significance of multiple affiliations. Here is further evidence of the complex and contradictory discourse about social capital and social cohesion, about belonging and Britishness.

At the same time we may see the way in which the social capital of diaspora communities is replicated in exile. Thus intra-national struggles, such as between Somali clans, are reflected in the fragmentation of social capital between the clans in exile. Here, the formation of social capital points to the reconstruction and consolidation of distinctive sub-groups in clubs and businesses. Yet, external threats – for example, the exodus of Somalis from the Netherlands because of increasing racial tension – act as mechanisms to solidify social capital at a macro-level. Thus the structure and origins of migrant communities vis à vis their immigration status critically affect how they perceive and value cohesion.

Developing social capital, therefore, may often be an essentially defensive response to contradictory policies on entry, dispersal, cohesion and integration, which paradoxically push the formation of separate groups who may perceive themselves as outsiders in an essentially hostile immigration policy environment. Paradoxically, therefore, some organisations seem able to consolidate their social capital despite the fact that the constituent groups may be antagonistic. The significance of contingent processes and factors cannot be overemphasised.
Immigration, social cohesion and social capital

Irrespective of specific cases, immigration is set to become an increasingly significant driver of social capital formation in the context of: the relentless process of restrictionism; the proliferation of categories of immigrant; and growing numbers of economic migrants from diverse ethnicities and nationalities competing for entry to a country of managed migration. In these circumstances we can envisage the social capital of exclusion becoming a dominant force not a cohesive commodity. Again this serves to emphasise how competing national policy agendas may produce contradictory outcomes that challenge the very discourse of consensualism they seek to promote.

Structures and organisation, identity and purpose

Neither an overarching process nor a common set of principles for the organisation of social capital among migrant groups emerges at this stage of our work. While ‘membership’ almost inevitably precedes ‘resources’ as a formative element of social capital, there is a close interplay between them. Both seem essential features of social capital among migrant groups. Dense (family and kinship) ties coexist with so-called ‘weak’ (institutional) ties and our impression is that both are equally significant among migrant groups seeking mutual support and, crucially, engagement with the resources and networks of the ‘host’ society.

The sequencing of these different components of social capital varies between different groups and in relation to the different purposes of associational activity. But again at this stage no clear pattern emerges. While the time dimension is significant, it is not an overriding factor in the process of accumulating and consolidating social capital. Conversely, access to funding is crucial. Virtually all the groups we interviewed identified the ‘glass ceiling’ of funding constraints and the declining availability of public resources. Although this is a perennial problem for NGOs, there are echoes here of the earlier critique that the promotion of social capital is merely a substitute for reduced public welfare expenditure and entitlements.

There is neither a commonly agreed view on the relationship between social capital and social cohesion, nor a shared agenda on cohesion. Notable are both the fluidity of structures and the complex interplay in how cohesion and separateness are expressed through the organisations at different times. Migrant groups accommodate their identities in different ways, at different times and at different levels of governance. In other words, the formation and use of social capital is contextual and multi-levelled. This is a crucial observation.
Social capital, social cohesion and immigrant communities

On diversity and cohesion, a voice that may at times be discordant in relation to national cohesion policies in order to assert identity and challenge prejudice – notably in the last few years around the issue of Islamophobia – may at other times be very supportive. Thus, some migrant groups sign up to social cohesion policies represented by the Government’s citizenship processes, because this strategic choice places them on an inside track to influence the policy agenda. Other groups are strongly opposed to Britishness conceived in terms of citizenship, arguing that cohesion is less about accommodating diversity with shared social values and aims, but crucially about issues of justice and equality of opportunity where ethnic minorities remain disadvantaged. In this context social capital is more a medium for advocacy and activism, less an instrument of cohesion.

Among organisations working with young people in BME and migrant communities, detachment from the debate on cohesion is mirrored by a similar disengagement from wider political discourse. In this sense they share the phenomenon of political disengagement identified among young people across British society, whether settled or migrant. This evidence has potentially harmful implications for the process of embedding the Government’s vision of social cohesion in the mainstream of British social life. What it also demonstrates is the impossibility of capturing, in a monolithic vision, the complexity and dynamicism of social relationships in youth communities, whether BME or ‘white’. It further shows how the vocabulary of social cohesion is both overused and oversimplified as a policy instrument. It fails to reach the different constituencies or target groups. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that cohesion cannot be developed through different local patterns – the tension between national prescription and the diversity of local processes and patterns is again evident.
5 Conclusions, further questions and policy issues

Not surprisingly, the picture that emerges of the relationship between social capital, social cohesion and immigration is one of complex and often contradictory processes. The development of social capital is mediated by many factors, not just the inherent characteristics of the groups; the impact of the immigration policy environment, driven by the restrictive arm of the State and deterrence towards refugees and asylum seekers, has been highly instrumental. Moreover, notions of cohesion and consensualism within and between groups, dominant features of Putnam’s conception of social capital, are not universally present among migrant entities. Conflict and consensus may coexist within groups and between ethnic and religious minority groups and dominant social groups. These divergent tendencies may expand or diminish in response to perceived external threats – e.g. Islamophobia, anti-Iraq war movements – and internal organisational and group pressures such as clan differences among Somalis. Thus the interplay between social capital and social cohesion is invariably uneven.

Overall, perceptions of ethnicity and minority status, and how these are represented in a majority identified society, are much more complex than notions of separateness, diversity or cohesion. At times this diversity, and the ‘parallel worlds’ it reflects, may be problematic and dysfunctional when exclusion and alienation engender racial distrust and conflict. Social capital, on the other hand, is perceived as a key resource to ensure ‘system stability’ defined in terms of social cohesion. With its notions of consensus and harmonious interaction by different groups, social capital is in some senses the practical tool to achieve social cohesion.

Social capital formation and migrant communities

Turning first to some key conclusions about social capital formation amongst migrant groups, however, this reveals a much more nuanced and challenging interpretation of the processes.

- From one perspective, the production of social capital is frequently about negotiating entry to the host society and its structures, and tackling resource shortfalls created by lack of access. Here the emphasis on difference, separateness and distinctive needs may be as much part of a negotiating position as it is a matter of defining an identity. Once the barriers have been scaled and resources have been obtained then ethnic difference may be less significant.
Conclusions, further questions and policy issues

Equally, the accumulation of social capital may tell us as much about the nature and identity of the groups themselves as about the agenda of social cohesion. Forming social capital can be a process of delineating boundaries among sub-groups of a larger ethnic minority, as much as a process of stitching into the mainstream of British social policy on cohesion.

If ‘difference’ is significant, the ability, indeed the necessity, to sustain multiple identities is part and parcel of the contemporary social life for migrant groups in an increasingly globalised world. Migrant groups handle rather well the demands of multiple social identities to a greater or lesser degree. This is a challenge that is perhaps not fully recognised in the contemporary discourse on citizenship and social cohesion as it shifts to a more assimilationist model of integration.

It is clear that, as one might expect, different statuses – gender, legal, ethnicity, length of residence – mediate the existence of very different forms of social capital among migrant groups. Highlighting both the complexity and richness of social capital that can be found, such a conclusion makes it much more difficult to latch on to social capital as a social policy resource by which to promote social cohesion. Indeed it is the ‘fine grain’ and variety of forms of social capital present among migrant groups that in many ways emphasises diversity at the expense of some unifying values and norms of cohesiveness.

Immigration, social capital and social cohesion – what are the links?

Turning now to some more general conclusions, what does the interplay between the concepts of social capital and social cohesion tell us about how migrant groups engage with the settled society, and how might this inform our understanding about policies for social cohesion?

A social capital perspective:

- Emphasises the complexity and above all the localisation of power, processes and practices by which communities form and ‘cohere’. The tension between a somewhat monolithic or ‘unilinear’ national discourse and diverse local practice, a consistent theme of the paper, confirms the crucial need to develop a much more nuanced vocabulary of social cohesion as a policy instrument that can accommodate different constituencies and localities. To repeat the earlier conclusion, the variety of forms of social capital that we found in migrant groups privilege diversity at the expense of some unifying values and norms of cohesiveness.
Highlights the significance of 'soft' variables such as social networks, leadership, community bonds and trust as the basis of a social cohesion policy premised on developing social relations between different groups. While these variables have been well documented in earlier research on community and race relations in the UK, they have been somewhat marginalised in recent years. Their 'reinstatement' has important implications for understanding how different social groups form and shape their identities, and thus how they bridge and link (cohere) to wider society.

Calls attention to the importance of the governance in community formation and the development of community relations — accessible structures, responsive public agencies, building support networks, active public education, community and civic development are key variables here. Above all, a social capital perspective recognises the importance of providing public ‘space’ for migrant communities to develop, evolve and empower themselves.

Reinforces, in its use of the concepts of bridging and linking processes, the view that cohesion is about how interactions take place between migrant communities and local hosts, not just the ‘performance’ of migrant communities themselves.

Reveals how the associational activity of migrant organisations, membership and resources often appear to be used as the media for advocacy, activism and access to public resources, less an instrument of cohesion. Superficially, this appears to challenge a policy of social cohesion founded on consensualism and shared values. A more useful interpretation is to argue that, no different from other community groups found among the settled population, these are the conventional political processes by which social welfare policies are shaped; by which competing priorities are differentiated, debated and mediated; and by which ‘shared values’ are indeed shared, debated and evolve. From this perspective these are processes of engagement not separateness.

Shows how migrant groups are usually able to accommodate multiple social affiliations at different times and at different levels of governance. In other words migrant communities, just as the settled population, can ‘cohere’ simultaneously to different social worlds and communities; but this cohesion can also coexist with separateness. This richness and complexity is both a challenge to and a resource for social cohesion policies premised on reconciling both shared and distinctive cultural identities.

Reminds us that associational activity among communities is a dynamic process. Thus the tendency for new migrant groups to form the social capital of bonding, differentiation and ethnic involution in the early stages of settlement, can evolve
Conclusions, further questions and policy issues

... into bridging and linking social capital. Social cohesion policies need to accommodate the inevitable ebb and flow of these transitions.

- Emphasises that social cohesion for migrant groups is contingent to the wider policy discourse on immigration. The backdrop of highly restrictive immigration policies and aggressive public and media rhetoric towards the ‘other’ may be creating the social capital of exclusion not social cohesion. Competing national policy agendas produce contradictory outcomes, challenging the very discourse of consensualism they seek to promote.

While recognising the critiques and limitations of the concept of social capital, it nonetheless provides an effective lens with which to investigate social cohesion and immigration. In two respects it has been valuable. Its focus on process rather than concrete and measurable outcomes, although frustrating because it can seem to produce nebulous findings, is a particular strength in this context. Policy makers searching for measurable indicators need to address a more nuanced explanation of how and why migrant communities form their social capital and what this tells us about social cohesion. Moreover, by focusing on the micro-level of associational activity and community relations, it serves to remind us that this is the real world of day-to-day life and interactions between different groups. Much as it may seem a national imperative to define and reinforce a view of a cohesive society, a social capital perspective reinforces the inevitable diversity and complexity of the social worlds in which migrant and settled communities interact.

In the end, the extent to which social cohesion characterises migrant communities depends less on the strength and variety of their social capital than on the prevailing immigration policy discourse, the backwash of hostility to asylum seekers and refugees and how this impacts on the migrant groups’ perceptions of belonging, and the instrumentality of social cohesion policies implemented in the simplistic form of inclusive citizenship. From this perspective we suggest that the concept of social capital, premised on a notion of social cohesion and consensualism, is at best only partially relevant to the more contested political landscape and host community responses at the present time. In this milieu, the coexistence of multiple identities, some perceived to be threatening to an ideology of cohesion, others surprisingly ‘on message’, may be the most useful way of viewing relationships between different migrant groups and the settled ‘host society’.
Notes

Chapter 1

1 By new migration we mean national and ethnic minorities coming to the UK since the early 1990s – see Runnymede Trust (2005).


Chapter 2


3 There is an irony here: at a time when the UK is adopting a more assimilationist stance, EU partners such as France and Germany, which are archetypical assimilationist countries, are beginning to adopt a multicultural inflection to their integration policies.

4 Examples here are policy initiatives, under the broad title of community and neighbourhood development, which have periodically dominated the social policy agenda, for example: the Community Development Programmes (CDPs) of the early/mid 1970s; the early 1980s in the Department of the Environment (DoE) (after the outbreak of urban riots at that time); the late 1990s, the SRB (Single Regeneration Budget) of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR); and most recently neighbourhood renewal programmes of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).
Chapter 3

1 Although a plausible account of how other migrant communities develop associational structures, Loizos’ analysis is specifically limited in time and space. His research concerns ethnic groups – Greeks, Armenians and Jews – who were displaced by the ‘unmaking’ of the Ottoman Empire almost a century ago.

Chapter 4

1 See Appendix 1 for a schedule of the organisations.
References


Home Office (2003c) *Building a Picture of Community Cohesion.* London: Home Office Community Cohesion Unit


Appendix 1: Organisations and agencies interviewed

Asian Resource Centre, Birmingham
Bangladeshi Youth Forum, Birmingham
Congolese Community Church, Stoke-on-Trent
Coventry Refugee Centre, Coventry
Coventry Kurdish Association, Coventry
Coventry and Warwickshire Zimbabwean Community Group, Coventry
Heart of Birmingham Primary Care Trust, Birmingham
Horn of Africa Project, Birmingham
Midlands Ethnic Albanian Foundation, Birmingham
Muslim Council of Britain, London
OSABA Women’s Centre, Coventry
Pioneers – Leading the Way in Mentoring, Birmingham
REWIND, Birmingham
UAACO, Union of African and African Caribbean Community Organisations, Stoke-on-Trent
UK Asian Women’s Association
Zambian Community Church, Stoke-on-Trent
Community Cohesion Unit, Home Office
Community Cohesion Coordinator, City Council, Stoke-on-Trent
Asylum Project Coordinator, City Council, Stoke-on-Trent
Appendix 2: Immigration legislation

Asylum and Immigration Act 1993
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002
Asylum and Immigration Act 2004